





– Slow down / You’re taking me over… 1 
 
 –    Another victory like that and we are done for.2 
 
 
By the end of the 1980s, popular culture and media commentary brimmed 
with a self-conscious desire to name and describe the present. Few decades 
have had as clear an account of themselves as the 1980s, whatever the gaps 
and limits of that account. The 1990s became ever more sure of what had 
happened in the 1980s; but packing the 1990s themselves into a compelling 
summary proved more difficult. For the time being, those looking for 
stories of the last decade must make do with tracts like Stephen Bayley’s 
Labour Camp, a brief, bilious assault on the aesthetics and politics of Blair’s 
first term. For all his rancour, snobbery and carelessness, Bayley lands a 
few hits, and leaves a few hints. Bayley reads New Labour in terms not of 
social and economic policy, but of taste and image: Blair’s choice of car, the 
efforts at ‘rebranding Britain’, the design of the Dome. The cultural emblem 
of the Blair years, he proposes, is Elton John: 
 
He is a popular phenomenon, therefore it is irrelevant and elitist 
even to wonder if he is actually any good. He is emphatically 
middle-of-the-road. He is classless.... After a much-reported past of 
rock-star excess, he is clean, dried out…. Whoever would have 
thought you could relaunch old Labour? Whoever would have 
thought you could relaunch Elton John? The parallels between the 
two transformations are remarkable.3 
 
The thought is suggestive, but leaves much unsaid about the new terrain 
inherited and shaped by the Blair government. The problem from which 
this essay will proceed is that ‘middle of the road’, by the end of the 1990s, 
was not what it had once been. Nor, for that matter, was the hard shoulder. 
Elsewhere Bayley sees as emblematic Tony Blair’s brief consortation with 
Oasis – ‘Or at least, with Oasis’s yobbish, simian, leering, foul-mouthed 
songwriter and guitarist sharing a glass of People’s champagne at 
                                                          
1 Suede, ‘The Drowners’, Nude records single, 1992. 
2 James Joyce, Ulysses ed. Hans Walter Gabler, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986, p20. 
3 Stephen Bayley, Labour Camp: The Failure of Style over Substance, Basingstoke: Pan, 1999, p46. 
Downing Street with the Prime Minister’.4 But are Oasis, an act from 
independent guitar rock, really part of the same cultural milieu as Elton 
John? If they are, how and when did it happen? Trying to answer this 
question will lead us toward some major issues in the culture of the 1990s. 
The general argument of this essay is that the decade witnessed a new 
configuration of taste – including the construction of new, enlarged and 
profitable ‘alternative’ fields – across various kinds of cultural production. 
These ultimately seemed to parallel, and to support, the new configuration 
of politics. To explore these developments requires detailed analyses of 
particular fields. Many are possible – film, television, publishing, politics 
itself. The particular route here, one of the most telling available, will be the 
fate of ‘alternative’ pop music. 
 The history of popular music has long included the history of 
immanent subversion that is independent pop. But the 1990s saw this area 
operationalized much more fully within commercial culture. We might say 
not that the division between mainstream and alternative was broken 
down, but that (paradoxical, or even impossible, as it sounds) the division 
was resituated within the mainstream. ‘Alternative’ culture did not, on the 
whole, simply replace its previous antagonists: a coexistence was brokered 
between them. Both alternative and middle-of-the-road culture became 
subdivisions within corporate culture: options, tools, images. 
 My account of the recent importance of what we may call Corporate 
Indie – or what a Teenage Fanclub title wryly dubbed ‘Commercial 
Alternative’5 – does not mean blindness to the compromises made by 
previous forms of independent culture. This culture has always been in a 
changing relationship with large cultural organizations and sources of 
capital, from EMI to the BBC. Equally, its formal development has always 
occurred in relation to that of the mainstream: the history of independent 
pop is among other things a dialogue with non-independent pop, in which 
both participants have repeatedly been transformed. Nonetheless, the 
1990s saw a new chapter in this story, in which independence became – 
depending on one’s perspective – a more problematic ideal, or a more 
profitable idea. Before discussing its recent fate, let us examine how that 
idea of independence was initially formed. 
 
 
Loser Wins: Towards Indie 
 
The definition of indie is a notorious conundrum. The obvious definition is 
important: it implies the products of independent record labels – in turn 
                                                          
4 Bayley, Labour Camp, p87. 
5 On Teenage Fanclub, Thirteen, Creation Records LP, 1993. 
defined by their difference from the corporate ‘majors’. But the idea of 
indie is no more reducible to this than ‘postmodernism’ simply means 
anything after modernism. Independent record production has existed 
alongside major label record production since before rock & roll, when 
small labels were known as ‘mongrels’,6 and most musical genres have 
been released on independent labels; in the 1990s and since, dance music is 
a notable example. (It is arguable, in fact that each genre of popular music 
has generated its own independent wing, a challenge to the centre and a 
provocation to change.) In the 1980s, the fact that Stock, Aitken and 
Waterman’s phenomenally successful chart-pop dominated the indie as 
well as the main charts was a striking anomaly, and awkward for anyone 
wishing to define indie in strictly economic terms. The definition of indie in 
question here is narrower. It denotes, in effect, an sub-plot in the history of 
rock: of pop music associated with white musicians and listeners, and 
aurally dominated by guitars. More specifically, it signifies the concerted 
attempt, in the wake of punk rock in the early 1980s, to forge a popular 
music apart from the major labels and governed by imperatives other than 
commerce. Central to the indie ideal is the refusal to sell out; mainstream 
chart success is viewed as a potential source of corruption. A suggestive 
analogy is offered by Pierre Bourdieu’s theorization of the ‘cultural field’, 
in which ‘the economy of practices is based, as in a generalized game of 
“loser wins”, on a systematic inversion of the fundamental principles of all 
ordinary economies: that of business (it excludes the pursuit of profit and 
does not guarantee any sort of correspondence between investments and 
monetary gains), that of power (it condemns honours and temporal 
greatness), and even that of institutionalized cultural authority (the absence 
of any academic training or consecration may be considered a virtue)’.7 The 
rhetorical priority of an indie scene is, in Bourdieu’s terms, the 
‘autonomous’ perfection of the form, not the ‘heteronomous’ attempt to 
cash in on it. (Perfection here, though, is not consecrated or ‘musicianly’ as 
in progressive rock: punk leaves behind an aesthetic of acceptable 
amateurism.) 
 Historically, two other emphases have vied with commerce for 
centrality in pop music. One is deviance, which was central to early 
cultural studies’ interest in pop.8 Pop, in this view, is associated with 
protest: or more simply with generational anger, ennui or general 
disturbance. The other is art. The 1960s’ nervous interest in the quality of 
McCartney’s melodies and Dylan’s ‘poetry’ marks a key instalment of this 
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p39. 
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idea9, but the more abundant fruit is in the beginning of the tradition of 
rock criticism. In the New Musical Express and Melody Maker in Britain, 
Village Voice and Rolling Stone in the US, there develops a distinctive sub-
genre of discourse about pop – or indeed the more weighty-sounding 
rock.10 To an extent, the perceived distinction between rock and pop maps 
onto that between art and commerce. A framework emerges in which 
certain versions of popular music can be treated, not only as cynically 
financial corporate ventures, but as the authentic expressions of talented 
individuals. 
 Both ideas, deviance and art, leave a residue in post-punk 
independent music – in the linked ideas of a music scene which also 
implies a kind of alternative society or subculture, and a pop which is 
made for love not money. A number of other, more variable, themes are 
also implicated in indie. These have included an anti-establishment 
attitude (more or less politically articulate); an aspiration towards 
withdrawal from the broader social world and its imperatives; a high 
premium placed on innocence and authenticity; and a disapproval of 
binary gender roles – in particular, of machismo. In these ways indie unites 
a conception of pop as art with a revision of ‘deviance’: a qualified, self-
conscious dissent which operates not only against political power or the 
older generation, but also against the norms enshrined (frequently as 
versions of ‘deviance’) by other youth cultures. 
 The most incisive formulation of all these subcultural features was 
made by Simon Reynolds in the mid-1980s. Surveying fanzines, record 
sleeves and teenage fashion, Reynolds saw a cult of childhood – 
‘dufflecoats… outsize pullovers… bows and ribbons and ponytails, 
plimsolls and danty white ankle-socks, floral or polka-dot frocks’.11 An I-D 
trendspotting column of 1987 listed similar signs: ‘Childlike innocence and 
assumed naivety permeate the Cutie scene – their clothes are asexual, their 
haircuts are fringes, their colours are pastel. Cuties like Penguin modern 
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classics, sweets, ginger beer, vegetables and anoraks’.12 The music itself, 
Reynolds reported, was wide-eyed and plaintive, rooted in folk rather than 
funk. The iconography of childhood was matched in the lyrics by a rhetoric 
of dreamy innocence: ‘furtive first love, gazing across schoolyards, waiting 
by the gates’.13 And the overt sexuality which by the 1980s had become 
mainstream pop’s main resource was countered by a desexualized 
conception of romance, in which the mind of the unrequited lover 
displaced the promiscuous body celebrated elsewhere. 
 Reynolds’ indie systematically inverted the norms of modern 
leisure, pitting etherality against carnality, celibacy against sexuality, pallid 
illness against tanned health, androgyny against reified gender, the 
authenticity of the gig or demo tape against the gloss of the pop video. And 
in all these ways, he proposed, it represented a sullen strike against the 
existing order: an attempt to counter the vulgarity of Thatcher’s country 
with an imagined other land, a ‘parallel system... bound in reaction’ to the 
music and society it spurned.14 Indie-pop – drawing inspiration, no doubt, 
from its unwitting avatars, Salinger’s Holden Caulfield and Plath’s Esther 
Greenwood – was founded on refusal. In its eschewal of aggression, 
though, this refusal was notably different from its predecessors in rock 
history: not least that made by punk rock in the late 1970s. The rhetoric of 
riot had been replaced by the iconography of innocence: subcultural youth 
had become less delinquent than regressive. 
 Reynolds’ ideal version of 1980s indie would inevitably be tempered 
by the variety of actual practice. But it remained the most acute summation 
of what had coalesced as indie culture. Steve Redhead drew similar 
conclusions in his 1990 survey of the independent scene, finding ‘a 
reworking of folk ideology’, opposing itself to a ‘Style Culture... already... 
branded as conservative and conformist’. The scene’s political meaning is 
‘the refusal of citizenship’: the valorisation of innocence is a knowing snub 
to a disciplinary society of government schemes and identity cards (one 
Thatcherite threat which never did materialize in the 1990s).15 Yet by the 
time Redhead’s book appeared, independent music was already 
profoundly changing. The 1980s ended with Morrissey’s single ‘Ouija 
Board, Ouija Board’ famously eclipsed on Top of the Pops by the 
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appearance, in the same edition in November 1989, of Manchester’s new 
musical leadership, Happy Mondays and the Stone Roses. This as much as 
any was the emblematic moment when Baggy crossed over: when the new 
hybrid of rock and dance music, and the paraphernalia that went with it, 
placed indie centre-stage. The 1990s, in effect, start here. 
 
 
Fool’s Gold: Crossover Indie 
 
The evident centre of the ‘Madchester’ canon is the Stone Roses’ 
eponymous debut LP, released in May 1989. But in aural terms, that record 
hardly marked a breakthrough. Its basis was a four-piece rock line-up; its 
primary texture replicated the major indie sound of the 1980s, the 
arpeggiated jangle which the Smiths’ Johnny Marr and a host of others had 
resurrected from the Byrds’ Roger McGuinn, who had worked it up from 
folk music. The jangle was at once a piece of rock classicism and a gesture 
of rootsy, real-ale authenticity. It was also an androgynous, wilfully 
emasculated style, in which the thrust of the rock riff was displaced by a 
flowery scatter of harmonious notes.16 Lyrically, too, The Stone Roses mostly 
remained within the indie template, replaying the disembodied devotion 
that Reynolds had identified: ‘Have you seen her, have you heard? / The 
way she plays: there are no words / To describe the way I feel’.17 The 
record’s verbal terrain was elemental and abstract, made of light, water, air 
– and ‘stone’, the band’s prime verbal icon. 
 The Stone Roses, then, came straight out of indie, and were a long 
time breaking with its sonic and semantic terrain. Yet in late 1989 they 
made one of the most celebrated breaks in the movement’s history, when 
the ‘Fool’s Gold’ ep replaced four-square earnestness with shuffling funk. 
Interviewed by John Robb at the end of the year, Ian Brown said they were 
moving ‘in a groove direction’; Robb himself described ‘Fool’s Gold’ as 
‘reacting more to the house thing than the album’.18 The Roses’ allotted 
place in pop legend would be as the band that blended indie and dance. 
Ethnic connotations were involved: baggy is held to have infused the 
metronomic rhythms of ‘white’ rock with the syncopation of ‘black’ modes. 
The loping rhythm that underpins ‘Fool’s Gold’ was not a unique 
breakthrough: it was already being leaned on heavily not only by Happy 
Mondays but by an act like Stourbridge’s Wonder Stuff. But what really 
distinguished the Roses was mass popularity. At the end of 1989 they 
played to 7,000 at Alexandra Palace: an extraordinary figure eclipsed in 
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turn by the 30,000 crowd at their Spike Island show in mid-1990. The 
band’s impact was visible to an unusual degree, thanks to the adoption, all 
over the UK, of ‘Madchester’ fashion: flared jeans, vast t-shirts, fishing hats. 
At the start of the 1990s this became an alternative uniform for NME 
readers, brasher than the Start-Rite aesthetic that Reynolds had pinpointed. 
The style was a hybrid, as the ‘Casual’ fashion that had developed on the 
football terraces of the North-West since the late 1970s took on a loping 
looseness analogous to the rhythms of the Roses and Mondays. Most 
importantly, it was popular, appealing to (and in large part derived from) 
working-class consumers and becoming standard issue in British youth 
culture. 
 The Baggy crossover thus worked on different levels. If it 
temporarily became an unavoidable part of Britain’s visual landscape, it 
also marked the hybridizing expansion of indie: musically, beyond its 
existing rhythms into black genres; socially, into the clubland and drugs 
that had become the centre of pop deviance during the moral panics of the 
late 1980s.19 Such expansion was a shift from the indie ethic of the 1980s, 
which Reynolds had seen as turning ever more in upon its own purity. 
Madchester – summarized in the title of the Mondays’ single Twenty-Four-
Hour Party People – embraced precisely the hedonism against which 
Reynolds had seen indie taking a puritan stand. More precisely, it was a 
new, grass-roots hedonism: little to do with the glossy travelogues of 
Duran Duran videos, more about ungainly, chemically-encouraged 
dancing at the Hacienda. Still, the mood had changed.20 The major 
protagonists of Baggy were unreliable standard-bearers: both Roses and 
Mondays would implode, the former having taken five notorious years to 
complete a second LP which owed more to Led Zeppelin than the Byrds or 
acid house. But the moment was significant. Madchester was the site of a 
new synthesis of students and casuals, margins and mainstream; in this it 
would set an example for the rest of the 1990s. 
 In America, the confrontation between alternative and mainstream 
was already proving more dramatic. The one thing that marked ‘grunge’ 
even more than its commercial triumph was its anxiety about that 
phenomenon. Nirvana’s Kurt Cobain himself was unusually plagued by 
the betrayal of the indie ideal, and ‘selling out’ became almost an obsession 
in his lyrics and public pronouncements. The cover of the 9-million selling 
Nevermind (1991) had announced the dilemma, figuring the tragic 
encounter of innocence with commerce in a baby swimming towards a 
dollar bill. By the third LP, In Utero (1993), Nirvana were ostentatiously 
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seeking a return to authenticity with the hardcore producer Steve Albini, 
even or especially if that meant unlistenability. Cobain’s unsubtle 
thematization of his plight was in evidence again, from the record’s 
opening line (‘Teenage angst has paid off well’) to the raucous ‘Radio-
Friendly Unit Shifter’ (‘I do not want what I have got’). The dilemmas of 
success were probably not the fundamental reason for Cobain’s suicide in 
April 1994, but his suicide note referred to the unbearable hypocrisy of 
stardom, and to the betrayed ideals of independence.21 Cobain’s rhetoric 
was blunt, and his demise catastrophic; but in his melodramatic, self-
destructive way he had seen the future of the ‘alternative’ with some 
clarity. 
 Grunge’s place in American culture is central to the invention of a 
Corporate Alternative lifestyle in the 1990s. But it was also indirectly 
responsible for other changes. In Britain, the press was considered to have 
under-reacted disastrously to Cobain’s death, showing itself out of touch 
with a generation’s mood: it would try not to make that mistake again. 
Earlier than this, grunge had already been used as a counterweight in the 
development of Britain’s own mainstream alternative. 
 
 
The Great Escape: Britpop 
 
If grunge was conceived as America’s true punk explosion, Britpop initially 
grew out of London’s far more self-consciously inauthentic attempt to 
rerun the late 1970s, the New Wave of New Wave. The idea was a return to 
concision and confrontation, short sharp songs in the mode of Wire or the 
Jam. Retrospection was thus present from the start of the Britpop episode. 
But the unwieldily named NWONW remained a project for the weekly 
press and its readers, imprisoned in Camden dives and the circuit of small 
rock clubs around the UK. The repackaged movement that crossed over 
made its first appearance on the cover of Select in April 1993. A number of 
bands – among them Suede, the Auteurs, Denim, Saint Etienne – were 
gathered under the new label and interviewed; the whole collation was 
heralded by an article asserting their rediscovery of a British pop 
tradition.22 The notional movement was defined by its difference from 
grunge, which was seen as a form of US cultural imperialism: under the 
heading ‘Who Do You Think You Are Kidding, Mr Cobain?’, a caricatured 
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illustration drew on the Dad’s Army credits to show British indie repelling 
the Seattle invaders.23 
 Britpop’s invention of tradition encompassed World War II, 1960s 
television comedy, 1970s sweets – and, most importantly, a range of British 
rock bands, whose work was the site of theft, genuflection or both. The 
major reference points would multiply over the years. Select’s original 
Britpop was spearheaded by Suede, whose major homage was to the 
sexual ambiguity of glam-era David Bowie. Blur’s trilogy of LPs, Modern 
Life Is Rubbish (1993), Parklife (1994) and The Great Escape (1995) toured the 
British sounds of Pink Floyd, the Small Faces, new wave and ska, but 
above all the Kinks, whose mastermind Ray Davies appeared live with 
Blur’s Damon Albarn in 1995. Supergrass, Michael Bracewell notes, ‘were 
doing a passable imitation of the Spencer Davis Group’24; Elastica were 
sued for the extent of their imitation of Wire and the Stranglers. Most 
insistently, Oasis relished and encouraged risky parallels with the Beatles. 
The varied connotations of these names allowed for the cultivation of 
difference within the movement; but they all implied an obsession with 
historical reference and pastiche within a specifically British frame. Britpop 
was among other things a karaoke pop movement, an opportunity for 
contemporary musicians to pose as their heroes; and the resulting 
pantheon formed a composite national tradition. 
 Yet the fluorescent colours and comic figures of that first world map 
in Select would remain telling: Britpop was as much a stylization of 
Britishness as a report on it. Some of its protagonists – Suede’s Brett 
Anderson, Pulp’s Jarvis Cocker – were interested in describing seediness 
and squalor: Cocker, in particular, passionately muttered and yelped of 
provincial disappointment, chintzy furniture, woodchip walls and broken 
biscuits. But the dominant tone of Britpop would become an insistent 
chirpiness, a winking chipperness exemplified by the mid-nineties 
‘mockney’ persona of Albarn. Supergrass’s major hit, ‘Alright’, was one 
musical embodiment of the mood, with its pub piano and faux-naif vision 
of youthful high jinks. But the central aural example was Parklife itself, a 
record whose state-of-the-nation meditation was spread through style after 
musical style with an eclecticism unusual in a Number 1 LP. Blur would be 
scorned by more enthusiastically lumpen bands simply for knowing the 
word ‘genre’; but their ability to hop between modes was instructive, in 
tacitly implying the inauthenticity of the retro exhibits around them. 
 Once again, the break from the 1980s is noteworthy. Indie pop, 
Reynolds noted, had staked much on an authenticity that it pitted against 
the world of MTV and wine bars; its political refusal was matched 
                                                          
23 Select, April 1993, pp.60-1. 
24 Michael Bracewell, The Nineties: When Surface Was Depth, London: Flamingo, 2002, p16. 
aesthetically in the ‘retreat to an unbudgeable, sedimental “what really 
counts” – Good Songs, “quality”, integrity’.25 Something of this was 
replayed in the original hopes for Britpop, not least in Select’s mobilization 
of down-to-earth Britain against expansionist America. But in the event, the 
movement’s landscape was not the organic countryside but the ‘chemical 
world’ mooted by an early Blur single. After Parklife, for all its retro flair, 
there was no credible way back to a land without fun pubs and Happy 
Eaters; or indeed, musically, to jangly purism. 
 Oasis, unlike their rivals, still staked much on authenticity. 
Musically, they represented old-fashioned values: loud guitars, catchy 
tunes, presentation that was uncomplicated almost to the point of self-
parody. They were also sold via an idea of the North as the home of these 
virtues, and as the extension of a North-Western tradition from the Beatles 
through the Smiths and the Stone Roses. In this they contrasted profitably 
with much of Britpop, associated as it was with London, fashion and art-
school irony. In some ways Oasis communed with indie heritage: their 
dourness, their massive privileging of layered guitars (rather than the 
toytown keyboards of Blur or Pulp), their presence on Creation, which had 
fostered bands from the Jesus and Mary Chain and Felt to My Bloody 
Valentine and Ride. The continuity was more simply embodied in the role 
of Johnny Marr, who gave Noel Gallagher the guitar on which he had 
written the Smiths’ epic ‘How Soon Is Now?’.26 At the same time, Oasis 
broke with indie more emphatically than anyone. Their rhetoric of 
violence, drugs and crime refused the pacific introversion of the cutie kid. 
The androgynous yearning still latent in the early 1990s’ ‘shoegazing’ 
movement (Ride, Lush, Chapterhouse, Slowdive) was ousted by 
ostentatious, uncouth masculinity. Even without Liam Gallagher’s regular 
public demands for fights with celebrities, the simian swagger of his very 
movement was a long way from the shy shamble of the indie male. What 
the Gallaghers represented was an affirmation of rock from within an indie 
context – an incongruity which accounted for much of their initial impact. 
If they began as a fusion of ‘indie’ and ‘rock’ traditions – a cross between, 
say, Ride and the Rolling Stones27 – they progressively embraced the latter 
and shucked off the former.28  And this was most obvious in their attitude 
to the issue at the heart of indie’s self-definition: success. 
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 From the start, the Gallaghers were unashamed of their ambition. 
The point of the exercise was to be ‘the biggest band in the world’: qualms 
about this were the timid voice of old indie, which had curbed bands’ 
ambition for too long. Noel Gallagher’s interview with Loaded in 1995 
strongly restated this: 
 
[Why] start a band? Because you want to be number one.... When 
we started, there was all this apathy about bands that had had 
success from our scene, the NME indie thing or whatever you want 
to call it, and they had got on Top of the Pops and moaned about it. 
 If you don’t want to be the biggest band in the world then 
pack it in because there’s loads of hungry kids who want to be the 
biggest band in the world. Anything else is mediocre. Who wants to 
be just all right? Not me.29 
 
Gallagher does slip ambiguously between artistic and commercial scales of 
success. Elsewhere in the interview, his response to charting at no.2, behind 
Blur, is to fall back on the aesthetic: ‘[I]t’s like the jury is always rigged but 
the people, man, the people know and they do know. And if [Blur] do get 
their number one, well Englebert Humperdinck kept “Strawberry Fields” 
off the top. Englebert and Blur, Beatles and Oasis… it won’t hurt me that I 
didn’t get a number one because I know the people know. To us it’s never 
been about who’s biggest but who’s got the best song and I think people 
know we’ve got the best songs’.30 That last sentence flagrantly contradicts 
the unabashed commercialism of the statement quoted above. But the real 
point of Oasis was to close the gap: to dispel the dilemma of art and 
commerce by seeing those supposedly ‘best songs’ become the biggest too. 
Uniquely, the plan worked. Oasis remain the only band to emerge from 
‘the NME indie thing’ and conquer the market on such a devastating scale. 
In doing so, they seemed to render the idea of indie incoherent, or 
redundant. 
 In retrospect we can divide Britpop into three phases. The Select 
splash was the fanfare of the early period, in which the movement’s 
identity was still partly in flux, from Suede’s breakthrough in 1992 to the 
start of 1994. ‘High Britpop’, starting with ‘Girls and Boys’ in March 1994, 
saw the movement’s major long-players, from Parklife (May 1994) through 
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30 Loaded, October 1995, p173. 
to Oasis’s (What’s The Story?) Morning Glory and Pulp’s Different Class 
(October 1995). During this period of major musical and lyrical statements, 
the new ease with which crossover could be effected was still a matter for 
excitement among those who had served their time in the indie ghetto.31 By 
1995, the rivalry between Blur and Suede’s marginally different visions of 
England had been displaced by the pantomime war between Blur and 
Oasis, whose public battle in the singles charts of August 1995 was the 
highest-profile event in the history of British indie. That formation had 
always been founded, of course, on its distance from such matters. Its 
success, as ‘Country House’ and ‘Roll With It’ took the top two spots in the 
chart two weeks running, was also logically problematic. 
 When Oasis triumphed at the Brit awards in February 1996, they 
immediately made a special appearance on Top of the Pops, with Noel 
Gallagher wielding a guitar in the colours of the Union flag. The decadence 
of Britpop ran from this point on, and was characterized by two main 
features. On one hand, the fame of the movement’s stars became 
embarrassingly bloated. Oasis, above all, replayed the excesses of pre-punk 
rock legend. The Burnage landscape of the Gallaghers’ youth was 
displaced by Rolls-Royces, swimming pools and cocaine; Noel Gallagher 
self-parodically called his new London house ‘Supernova Heights’; Johnny 
Depp played guitar on their third LP. Even Jarvis Cocker, who took on the 
status of thinking person’s Britpop star, became known as a London ligger 
rather than a Sheffield outsider, spending a gossip-column year at bars and 
premieres. At the same time, the market was flooded with lower-level 
Britpop bands, to the point where three or more tiers of them could be 
constructed. If Blur and Oasis shared the summit, the likes of Sleeper and 
Cast were at best second-string, and Blur copyists Thurman were 
somewhere near the foot of the pile. Latecomers like the Supernaturals and 
the Candyskins, who spread second-hand cheeriness across the media of 
1996 and 1997, might have been designed to precede ad breaks on Chris 
Evans’ TFI Friday – itself a notable symptom of the world after Oasis and 
Loaded. 
 The dynamism that had powered the movement from ‘The 
Drowners’ to ‘Wonderwall’ was gone: the major acts began to retreat into 
alternative sounds (Blur’s eponymous, deliberately uncharacteristic 
venture into US lo-fi rock in 1997) or ‘comedown’, morning-after records 
(Pulp’s This Is Hardcore [1998], Oasis’s Standing On The Shoulder of Giants 
[2000]). Yet simply to say that Britpop came and went is inadequate. Its 
demise left a changed musical landscape. After the mid-1990s, the meaning 
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of ‘indie’ was altered. A new generation was forged – Stereophonics, 
Travis, Coldplay, Starsailor – which Andrew Mueller, writing in 2001, 
dubbed simply ‘Corporate Rock’. Pre-Britpop, Mueller noted, such acts 
‘would have been thought of as indie groups, alternative artists, of interest 
only to students and other consumers of the weekly music press’. But after 
the 1990s, ‘acts which could once have hoped at best for a well-kept plot in 
the graveyard of alternative rock are competing for chart positions and 
tabloid harassment against pre-fab pop groups’, thanks not least to an 
affluent adult rock audience which wants ‘a whiff, however spurious, of 
underground integrity’ about its purchases.32 David Cavanagh, in 2000, 
sees a similar landscape: ‘To the consumers of today, ‘indie’ means Travis, 
Coldplay and Stereophonics, bands that play guitars and don’t sound like 
Britney Spears. But the original meaning of indie was something quite 
different. It described a culture of independence that was almost a form of 
protest: a means of recording and releasing music that had nothing to do 
with the major labels’.33 For Cavanagh, a fundamental gulf separates the 
indie of the 1980s and that of the late 1990s: the latter is another tool in the 
corporate box. Indeed, he concludes, ‘in the 21st century music business at 
least, stories of independence are history’.34 
 Musically, corporate indie maintains a vestige of the old definition. 
It is guitar pop, not dance music. But the economic basis of independence 
has disappeared, or dwindled to a façade. Through the 1990s, major 
corporations bought up independent labels: to own their rosters, but also to 
provide a credible commercial front. The artistic kudos of the independents 
became a prize by which the majors could at once assert their own 
dedication to non-commercial values, and capture another niche market. In 
this sense the record industry of the 1990s enacted the same process of 
corporatization visible in other fields of cultural production and 
distribution, like publishing and film.35 But the intended effect has been 
hard to secure: the knowledge that most important indie labels were no 
longer what their name implied actually made for a devaluation of the 
category, to the point where even a bona fide independent would 
automatically be suspected of being a corporate front. By the turn of the 
millennium, the existence of indie was thus ambiguous. The category was 
seemingly more prevalent than ever, but its old meaning had ceased to 
signify as before. Once again the logic feared by Cobain applies: the one 
thing the concept could not survive was success. 
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New Indie, New Britain 
 
This exemplary narrative of the 1990s finds parallels in other fields. A 
recurring feature of the decade was the apparent crossover of the 
supposedly alternative artist to mainstream attention – to the point where 
the relation between the two terms must be rethought. The visual arts 
provided one, publicly prominent instance, as Julian Stallabrass has 
aggressively argued and as Michael Bracewell notes elsewhere in this 
issue.36 Broadcast media are also a case a point. Television comedy, for 
instance, was heavily populated in the 1990s by figures who had emerged 
as ‘alternative comics’ in the 1980s. Lenny Henry, Dawn French, Jennifer 
Saunders, Ruby Wax and Stephen Fry were middle of the road figures by 
the end of the 1990s. The trajectories of Ben Elton and Julian Clary were 
even more telling, in terms of party and sexual politics respectively. But a 
more direct analogue with the alternative pop of the 1990s was the career 
of David Baddiel. He progressed from the NME-class, student-directed 
comedy of the Mary Whitehouse Experience in the early 1990s to stadium 
comedy tours, and eventually to the definitive ironic new-lad football 
programme with Frank Skinner, Fantasy Football. Something of the 
nostalgia and irony of the football fanzine culture of the 1980s – a 
thoroughly grassroots formation, often laced with political dissent – 
survived here; but the result might have made the previous decades’ 
pioneers wonder what they’d spawned. The route from 1980s indie to 
1990s Britpop could be said to parallel that from the fanzines to Skinner & 
Baddiel – though that would be a wounding verdict on Britpop. As though 
to confirm the analysis, Skinner and Baddiel wrote and recorded the 
England theme ‘Three Lions’ with Ian Broudie, a scouse veteran of the 
1980s who had stumbled on temporary Britpop fame. The European 
Football Championship of 1996 was thus given the seal of the new 
generation, and became one of the central events in the decade’s repeated 
invocations of national identity.37 
 The most iconic example of such cross-media activity was 
Trainspotting. Irvine Welsh’s novel of 1993 furthered the tendency towards 
demotic, uncompromisingly dialect-based social realism which the West of 
Scotland had produced through the 1980s, through writers like William 
McIlvanney and James Kelman, and local journals like the Edinburgh 
Review. This could be viewed as a resistant cultural formation, articulating 
an anti-Thatcherism which was nowhere more thorough and committed 
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than in the country where the poll tax was first road-tested.38 Kelman’s 
Booker Prize win for How Late It Was, How Late in 1994 was not quite the 
crossover event one might have expected: the writer himself was 
uncompromising in accepting the award, critical response was 
ungenerous, and the novel’s sales failed to capitalize on the prize. Irvine 
Welsh, however, did lead the new Scottish fiction into the cultural centre of 
the 1990s. Unlike Kelman’s, his writing was tuned to the frequencies of 
youth – of sex, drugs, dance music, and the sort of seemingly trivial yet 
fiercely contested cultural references (James Bond films, Iggy Pop records, 
Scottish footballers) old which were a recurring feature of the decade. In 
itself, Welsh’s novel was already destined for cult significance; but more 
telling than this was its ready transition across the borders of different 
media, from fiction to drama and, especially, cinema. The cinematic team 
of Danny Boyle, John Hodge and Andrew MacDonald had already been 
presented as the new wave of Scottish film, on the basis of Shallow Grave 
(1994). Trainspotting, retaining Ewan McGregor from the earlier film, also 
reprised and extended its pacy, aggressive narrative style, forging a text 
that was formally diverse, yet somehow thoroughly recuperable by a 
young British audience. If the film’s jumpy narrative and flights of fancy 
seemed to recall aspects of the French new wave, it was not intended as 
unassimilable, open-ended experiment: textual variety had been put to 
rigorously effective ends. The Boyle team was the cinematic equivalent of 
Britpop: consciously and deliberately in hock to a revered past (their next 
film, A Life Less Ordinary, would be an open homage to It’s A Wonderful Life 
and A Matter of Life and Death), yet thoroughly of the moment; cashing in 
on a local British identity just as such local identities were seen to be 
rendered relative by global capital. The connection was sealed by the 
Trainspotting soundtrack, which rounded up crossover pop acts (Blur, Pulp, 
Elastica) and became a major seller in its own right, even running to a 
sequel. To add it to the CD racks was also to extend the reign of 
Trainspotting as a visual brand. Its unusual use of orange and white (with 
lettering that seemed, in an indeterminate retro gesture, to recall the signs 
inside an old Sainsbury’s from the 1970s) made it one of the most 
distinctive designs of the decade’s popular culture. The gallery of 
characters, addressing the camera in black and white, who appeared on the 
film’s posters and publicity, proved the extent of its public recognition by 
becoming the subject of parody – as on the cover of the NME’s Christmas 
issue of 1996, where second-division Britpop star Louise Wener, who had 
also appeared on the soundtrack, played all the parts. In such minor details 
                                                          
38 On Scotland in the Thatcher years see Christopher Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism, 
London: Routledge, 1994, ch. 7. For an account of the literary politics of the period see Peter 
Kravitz, ‘Introduction’ to The Picador Anthology Book of Scottish Fiction, London: Picador, 1997. 
the potency of the Trainspotting brand was demonstrated. In a sense the 
film itself, let alone the novel, had become secondary to the brand’s travels 
across media, the built-in drift with which two colours and a typeface 
could come to signify an event. That event was part of the episode in the 
history of popular taste that we have traced here. Was Trainspotting 
‘alternative’ or ‘mainstream’? It might be called either; and by virtue of that 
fact, neither term would seem a wholly adequate description of the cultural 
level in question.39 Something analogous could be said of Oasis, or indeed, 
even after their leader’s demise, Nirvana. 
 
All of this gained significance from its more specifically political context, in 
the form of New Labour and its gradual ascent towards power through 
mid-90s. The party that Tony Blair led from 1994 became a machine for 
permanent campaigning, which would attempt to use any available 
activity for publicity: photos of Blair juggling footballs with Kevin Keegan 
became a typical, rather than a bizarre, media phenomenon. Culture, 
inevitably, was part of the plan: and New Labour’s definition of culture 
was broad enough to include pop music. To employ pop for electoral ends 
was not a straightforward matter. It would risk echoing the mid-1980s, 
when the Red Wedge movement’s creation of at least a notional link 
between Neil Kinnock and Billy Bragg failed to win any elections. That 
movement’s most visible survivor a decade on was Paul Weller, now 
keeping a distance from politics; but his new associate Noel Gallagher 
proved less cautious. In fact, while various pop stars offered unsurprising 
messages of support to Labour, it was Creation records, the home of Oasis, 
that became most entangled in the project. Creation’s president Alan 
McGee, a Glaswegian who had been central to the British indie scene since 
the early 1980s, had an instinctive hatred of the Conservative party. 
Offered the chance to help oust them from power, he threw in his lot with 
Labour. In September 1996 Creation sponsored the Youth Experience Rally 
at the Labour conference in Blackpool, for £10,000. Tony Blair, entering to 
the sound of Oasis’ ‘Don’t Look Back In Anger’, was presented with an 
Oasis platinum disc. After paying tribute to the entrepreneurial McGee as 
an example of new Labour in action, he introduced the minor Creation 
band 18 Wheeler as Wheeler 18.40 The gaffe did not end McGee’s 
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involvement with Blair’s cautious assault on power. For Labour, he 
acknowledged, the home of Oasis represented a more appealing milieu 
from Red Wedge: ‘Obviously, I know to a certain extent that I’m being 
used, but I’m willing to go along with it’.41 He continued making large 
donations to the party, was invited to tactical discussions at Millbank with 
Peter Mandelson and Margaret McDonagh, and was present at Labour’s 
victory rally on the night of 1 May 1997. 
 The iconic event in this narrative, though, splashed over the next 
morning’s papers and elsewhere ever since, was the encounter of Blair 
with Noel Gallagher himself, in the reception for cultural figures given at 
No 10 on 30 July 1997. In one sense the moment was typically of the 1990s 
for its echo of the 1960s – of Harold Wilson’s cultivation of Gallagher’s 
heroes the Beatles. But in its own time, the image still recorded a strange 
meeting. In July 1992, the Labour Party’s return to Downing Street seemed 
about as improbable as the prime minister inviting to the place a guitarist 
from world of the NME. That both happened together was one of the 
decade’s most unlikely – but decisive – features. It has been surprisingly 
easy to forget to find it unlikely. 
 In government, Labour still sought to use the cultural industries. 
Alan McGee was the most prominent among the businessmen invited to 
influence policy on the Creative Industries Task Force, and he took public 
pride in having gained a slight alteration in the government’s policy on 
young unemployed musicians.42 The young government’s claims to 
cultural renewal – to a newly enlightened attitude to creative talent and its 
importance to Britain – was most fully exemplified in Chris Smith’s Creative 
Britain (1998), a collection of speeches from the first year in power. Smith 
made much of the economic benefits of creativity; indeed, the book closes 
with an appendix on the importance of the various arts as UK export 
industries. But Smith also made a point of emphasizing the value of 
creativity ‘in and for itself, for its own worth’, for the self-development of 
individuals, and for the good of society.43 In its optimism about cultural 
renewal – echoed well enough by Damien Hirst’s colourful splash on the 
front cover – Creative Britain is a text of its time, a product of the first year 
or so of government. As Martin Jacques observed early in 1998, the Labour 
government initially sought not only to realize the value of culture as 
industry, but to hegemonize its meaning: 
 
After the election, the Government sought to popularize the notion 
that we were entering a new era – culturally as much as politically. 
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The chosen symbols were corporate executives and cultural 
celebrities, including Britpop stars. A government’s ability to move 
from the political to the cultural is a defining moment: it enables its 
appeal to transcend political divisions and become national, rather 
than partisan. Blair played this card for all it was worth.44 
 
Whatever the self-indulgent vagaries of his own political judgments, 
Jacques hits a major chord here. Stuart Hall, with Jacques and others, had 
sought in the 1980s to analyze Thatcherism as a hegemonic project, one 
that took command of signs and discourses as well as the levers of power.45 
Jacques points here to the relevance of a similar analysis of Blairism; of its 
bid to dictate – or to mimic – the way the nation talked and felt. The 
political and the cultural, it was clear after May 1997, were becoming so 
closely linked as to be almost inseparable.46 ‘New Labour’ was hard to take 
seriously as a phrase, let alone a concept, by 1997, so thoroughly ridiculed 
had it been by the rolling media. Yet its images and idioms – paging, spin, 
branding, modernization, traditional values in a modern setting, toughness 
on the causes of a given phenomenon – simultaneously saturated society. 
Saturation coverage had always been central to the project. New Labour, 
understandably paranoid as it faced down the last four election results, 
sought to leave no stone unturned, no compromise unbrokered, no historic 
enemy unplacated. These were the politics of the Big Tent, which stayed 
pitched longer than initial electoral success might have dictated. Among 
New Labour’s political foundations was the widest possible consensus, an 
imaginary resolution in which trades unions and the Sun could 
miraculously pull in the same direction. The full story of what all of this 
meant for British culture – in which the very idea of ‘culture’, let alone 
‘British’, might need to be redefined – remains to be written.47 But such an 
account would need to traverse the terrain indicated here: the shifting 
borders of the alternative and the mainstream in popular culture, even in a 
domain that looks as politically marginal as popular music. What the story 
of corporate indie offers us is not, of course, an explanation of the rise of 
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the social democratic phase of neo-liberalism – but a possible analogue for 
it.48 
 It is suggestive to take the hint from Red Wedge and the Blair-
McGee alliance – one of the definitive cultural trajectories from the 1980s to 
the 1990s – and consider the twenty-year trajectories of independent music 
and the Labour Party in parallel.49 In effect, New Labour and corporate 
indie both represent historic compromises on the part of movements which 
had defined themselves in opposition to the dominant social logic – 
particularly that of the Thatcher years. (Undoubtedly, that oppositional 
stance is in part a retrospective construction, a hazy look back from the 
other side of the grand sell-out – to real indie or Real Labour.) In both 
movements there is a shift from a left puritanism which refuses Thatcherite 
excess and consumption (Morrissey, Benn) to an era in which money, 
marketing, spin and showbiz are accepted or indeed celebrated (Gallagher, 
Mandelson). In both cases the rank and file (fans, members, voters) are 
generally prepared to accept, even to embrace, such compromises and 
incongruities as part of their long-awaited victory (the chart success of 
independent rock, the defeat of the Conservative Party). In both cases, an 
ideal scale of achievement – musical or ideological purity – is displaced by 
a pragmatic one – chart success, marginal constituencies won – once such 
unimagined success becomes bewilderingly possible. What was outside 
thus becomes inside: Blunkett and Cook at Education and the Foreign 
Office; ‘Don’t Look Back In Anger’ on every jukebox. And this transition 
implied a re-examination and redefinition of the terms which had 
dominated the story: left, right, independence, mainstream. What an 
alternative – political or cultural, or both – might look like, what space it 
might occupy, and whether co-operation with the dominant culture had 
the same meaning: these issues were recast in the 1990s. 
 
The instances of mainstreaming and crossover surveyed here could be 
extended, or analyzed more fully in their particular contexts. In the 
meantime, as a provisional conclusion, let us ask what they add up to. One 
readily available answer is ‘selling out’: the betrayal of aesthetic or political 
ideals in the name of mass appeal. Another is success: it may be argued 
that the aim of alternatives was always to capture and reshape the 
mainstream. In fact, both processes are arguably part of the dialectic of the 
1990s. A full account would need to recognize, on one hand, the extent to 
which ‘alternatives’ were already compromised and conservative, and on 
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the other, the ways in which the mainstream has for good or ill been 
remade. ‘Incorporation’ does not capture all the nuances, not least because 
the dominant and incorporating culture is no longer what it was. What was 
forged through the 1990s was a new consensus, with new exclusions 
different from the old, and a tendency to homogenization and assimilation 
quite different from the more starkly imposed, socially polarizing doctrine 
of the Thatcher years. For now, in deference to the temporal event to which 
Blair’s late nineties consciously built, and to the persistence of this 
formation in the 2000s, we can dub this the Millennial Consensus. 
 Its inventory would have to include an ostentatious generational 
shift, with the Prime Minister publicly enthusing about Oasis in 1997 and 
fathering a new baby in 2001; and a softening of public language, an 
apparent openness to the subjective, and in particular the rueful and 
wounded: from Blair’s response to the death of Diana to the unending new 
confessions of Geri Halliwell. (What Roger Luckhurst, elsewhere in this 
issue, identifies as a culture of trauma is intimately related to this 
development.) This softening coincided with another kind of blur, as the 
boundaries between activities – art, entertainment, advertising, politics, 
sport – seemed to dissolve into a generalized flow of celebrity. Football is a 
case in point: the decade saw its elevation from popular national sport to 
omnipresent media element, fuelled by satellite money and soundtracked 
to the Stone Roses or Stereophonics. An analysis of the millennial 
consensus might proceed from the game’s interaction with Madchester at 
the start of the decade, to its metropolitan interface with Britpop and 
comedy (Albarn, Baddiel) in the mid-90s, through to David Beckham’s 
attainment of all-purpose stardom, his image increasingly removed from 
actual activities and skills. The objective correlative of this cultural solvency 
would turn out to be digital technology, the philosopher’s stone of the 
period in its capacity to translate between hitherto incommensurable forms 
and substances. 
 Corporate indie is not necessarily central to this narrative of the 
1990s. But it is important and emblematic, not least because it represents 
the assimilation to the Big Tent of what had been one of British culture’s 
most dolorously recalcitrant redoubts. The ultimate bard of the millennial 
consensus might indeed be neither Noel Gallagher nor Bayley’s 
nomination Elton John, but Robbie Williams. But even Williams’ own path 
to landslide victory and consensual domination had involved a crucial 
diversion through Britpop, in his much-publicized revolt from the boy 
band Take That into rabble-rousing with Oasis at Glastonbury in 1995. 
‘When Liam asked him on stage’, recalled the Creation employee Tim 
Abbot, ‘that was his spiritual calling. The puppet strings were cut the day 
he went on stage’. Fired from Take That, Williams opined that ‘Meeting 
Oasis completely changed my attitude to what I was doing and what I 
wanted to be. It freed me from a lot of things’.50 The cameo is telling: about 
Oasis’s potency in mid-decade, and about their formative role in forging 
the formation which would outlive their own boom time. Whether the Big 
Tent was ultimately more successful than the Dome; whether any 
associated progressive gains made the new homogenization of British 
culture worthwhile; whether digital possibilities will ultimately increase 
the prospects for independent cultural work – these questions may be 
answered more authoritatively as the legacy of the 1990s becomes clearer. 
For now, we may wonder whether the era of New Democrats and New 
Labour, Commercial Alternative and corporate indie, was the decade of the 
pyrrhic victory. 
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